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Abstract
Comparativism—the view that mass ratios are not grounded in absolute masses—
faces a challenge by Baker which suggests that absolute masses are empirically mean-
ingful. Regularity comparativism uses a liberalised version of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis
Best Systems Account to have both the Laws of Newtonian Gravity and the absolute
mass scale supervene on a comparativist Humean mosaic as a package deal. I discuss
three objections to this view, and conclude that it is untenable. The most severe
problem is that once we have reduced away the absolute masses, there is nothing
that stops us from also reducing the mass ratios.
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1 Introduction
In response to Newton’s bucket—i.e. the argument from inertial effects, against rela-
tionalism about space, which purports to show the empirical meaningfulness of inertial
frames—Van Fraassen (1970) has pointed out that it is not the structure of absolute space
that is required to privilege certain frames, but merely the truth of Newton’s laws in
those frames. Huggett (2006) uses this insight to formulate a version of relationalism
that ‘gets inertial frames for free’. Regularity Relationalism employs the framework of
Humean Supervenience—in particular the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis Best Systems Account—to
have both the inertial frames and the laws supervene as a package deal on a relational
Humean mosaic.
Comparativism about mass (Dasgupta 2013; Baker 2013; Martens 2017)—the view
that mass ratios are not grounded in absolute masses—faces a challenge analogous to
Newton’s bucket. If we consider a two-particle world governed by the laws of Newtonian
Gravity, the comparativist initial conditions (distance, velocity and mass ratios) will be
insufficient to provide a deterministic evolution of the system, as the escape velocity in-
equality (ve >
√
2Gm
r
) depends on the absolute masses over and beyond the mass ratios
(Baker 2013). This ‘comparativist’s bucket’ suggests that the absolute mass scale is em-
pirically meaningful (Martens 2017). An obvious comparativist response seems to be a
regularity version of comparativism that attempts to ground in a comparativist Humean
mosaic both the absolute mass scale and the laws of Newtonian Gravity as a package deal.
After outlining the framework of Humean Supervenience and in particular the Mill-
Ramsey-Lewis Best Systems Account in Section 2, I discuss regularity relationalism (Sec-
tion 3) and regularity comparativism (Section 4). The remaining three sections discuss
three arguments against regularity comparativism in Newtonian Gravity, leading to the
conclusion that this view is untenable.
2 Empiricism about Laws of Nature
Perhaps the most popular incarnation of empiricism about laws of nature goes under
the name of Humean Supervenience. Earman already considered whether “laws are
parasitic on occurrent facts” in 1984, but the most well-known formulation of the view
stems from Lewis in 1986:
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater [sic] denier of necessary
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of fact, just one little thing and then another. [...] We have
geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distances between
points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe pointsized bits of matter
2
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted)
Please use DOI when citing or quoting
or aether fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities:
perfectly natural instrinsic properties which require nothing bigger than a point
at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
And that is all. All else supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986, ix-x)
The name ‘Humean Supervenience’ suggests that this view in fact goes much further back
than 1986, but we will question below whether Lewis’ motivations and justifications were
indeed the same as Hume’s.
As Maudlin points out, Lewis’ thesis of Humean Supervenience in fact comprises two
logically independent theses (2007b).
The first states that:
Separability: “The complete physical state of the world ... supervenes on ... the intrinsic
physical state of each spacetime point (or each pointlike object) and the spatio-
temporal relations between those points.” (2007b, 51)
Or, as Maudlin informally glosses it, all fundamental properties are intrinsic properties,
except for spatio-temporal relations, which are the only fundamental external properties
(i.e. relations).
In the context of this paper it will prove useful to note that Separability—at least
according to the informal gloss—seems to comprise two additional theses. Firstly, it is
committed to Strong Absolutism about all non-spatio-temporal quantities1 such as mass
and electric charge, i.e. both (Weak) Absolutism—the view that absolute masses ground
mass ratios (Dasgupta 2013; Martens 2017)—and Quantity Primitivism (QP). The
latter is the view that these absolute quantities are fundamental. Secondly, it is committed
to 4D-fundamentalism: the view that the four-dimensional spatio-temporal relations are
fundamental (as opposed to for instance a 3N-dimensional configuration space)2.
It is not directly clear that the formal definition of Separability does indeed commit
to either QP or 4D-fundamentalism, because both theses only follow from twice sneaking
in the notion of fundamentality into the informal gloss. We will consider using this wiggle
room below. One could perhaps argue though that Lewis’ original quote is most naturally
interpreted by adding those fundamentality qualifiers.
What is clear is that the formal definition commits one to absolutism about all non-
spatio-temporal quantities. As it stands, Humean Supervenience is thus clearly not usable
by comparativists. Below we will discuss the option of liberalising Humean Supervenience,
in order to make it suitable for comparativists.
Besides Separability, Humean Supervenience comprises Supervenience3:
1In my DPhil thesis (2017) I argue that these views are to be understood in terms of what I call
‘magnitudes’, rather than quantities. Here the difference is not too important.
2Here I use terminology that is similar to Chen’s (2016).
3‘Physical Statism’ in Maudlin’s terminology.
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Supervenience: “All facts about a world, including modal and nomological facts, are
determined by its [complete] physical state.” (Maudlin 2007b, 51)
Separability of course requires the physical state referred to in Supervenience to be sep-
arable, but Supervenience by itself does not do so as it is a logically independent thesis.
How each thesis is motivated, and whether they can be motivated independently is an
issue that we will return to below.
Within this broad framework of Humean Supervenience, the exact manner in which
the nomological facts supervene on the separable physical state (i.e. the four-dimensional
Humean mosaic) is usually explicated via the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis Best Systems Account
(MRL) (Earman 1984; Lewis 1973). According to this approach, laws of nature are gen-
eralisations which are axioms or theorems of the ‘best’ axiomatisations of the Humean
mosaic. What makes an axiomatisation the best axiomatisation is an optimalisation of
two virtues that pull in opposite directions: simplicity and strength. The desideratum of
strength, or informativeness, is often quantified by the ‘amount’ of possible worlds it rules
out; simplicity is often cashed out syntactically.
3 Regularity Relationalism
Huggett (2006) defends a version of relationalism about space, regularity relationalism,
which makes crucial use of the MRL approach. This version is supposed to deal with,
inter alia, the problem posed by Newton’s bucket, i.e. inertial effects. The substantivalist
posits fundamental absolute space to provide the inertial frames in which Newton’s laws
hold and with respect to which the absolute acceleration is determined that underlies
Newton’s bucket. Huggett however builds upon the key insight by Van Fraassen (1970)
that it is not the structure of absolute space that privileges certain frames, but merely
the truth of Newton’s laws in those frames. Thus, if we consider all the possible reference
frames that are naturally adapted (to be specified in more detail below) to the spatio-
temporal relations of the Humean mosaic, for some of these frames the laws that are
the best axiomatisations will be Newton’s laws, whereas the other frames will have best
axiomatisations comprising laws that include additional correction terms. The plausible
claim is then that the former set of reference frames provide the simplest (and strongest)
axiomatisation overall. It is only those frames in which Newton’s laws are true; it is merely
this fact that privileges those frames, no further ontological implications can be derived
from their privileged status. Thus, both the inertial frames and Newton’s laws supervene
as a package deal; the inertial frames come for free.
Now in slightly more detail. Huggett’s sparse mosaic consists merely of the Leibnizian
spatial relations of the particles over time, and their fundamental intrinsic properties such
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as mass and charge. Call this the relational state, or the Leibnizian-Humean mosaic. It
does not include other geometric relations, and in particular not an affine structure.
We then consider the set of what we will call ontological coordinate frames. As a first
pass, we might choose them to be the set of all adapted frames of all the bodies in the
world. A frame is adapted to a reference body if that body is at rest at the origin of
that frame. But, since in a world governed by Newtonian Gravity we would generally not
expect there to be any inertial bodies—since gravity cannot be shielded off—this set of
adapted frames would not include any inertial adapted frames. Instead we choose as our
set of ontological frames the set of adapted frames plus all frames related to those adapted
frames by arbitrary continuous spatially rigid transformations4.
In the final step we then axiomatise the Leibnizian-Humean mosaic separately for each
of these ontological frames. This will, Huggett claims, result in a privileged set of pairs of
Best System Frames and laws written in terms of those coordinates which are the simplest
(and strongest). These laws are Newton’s laws, and the frames are the inertial frames.
4 Regularity Comparativism
Regularity relationalism was inter alia a response to Newton’s bucket, which demonstrated
the empirical meaningfulness of a standard of inertia. The comparativist’s bucket, analo-
gously, demonstrates the empirical meaningfulness of an absolute mass scale. An obvious
move for the comparativist is to use the regularity approach: getting the absolute mass
scale for free by having it supervene on (or grounding it in) a mosaic of fundamental mass
relations (as a package deal together with the laws of Newtonian Gravity).
Huggett’s insight, building upon Van Fraassen’s insight, was that if we quantify over
the best axiomatisations of the Leibnizian-Humean mosaic as coordinatised by different
ontological frames, the inertial subset of those frames will drop out, since only in those
frames do the laws come out in their simplest Newtonian form. This easily translates to
the case of comparativism. That one absolute mass scale is privileged does not imply that
we should attribute it fundamental ontological status (relative to the mass ratios); it only
means—as the claim goes—that when we quantify over the best axiomatisations of the
Humean mosaic as ‘coordinatised’ by different absolute mass scales, the simple Newtonian
laws will be true for only one of those choices of scale.
Again in slightly more detail. Our Comparativist Humean mosaic consists of the
geometric structure (either merely the Leibnizian relations, or more structure) of all the
bodies over time, plus fundamental mass ratios between all5 bodies, plus their fundamental
4Pooley chooses these frames ab initio (2013, §3.1).
5In the case of Chain Comparativism (Martens 2017, Ch.5), there will only be a single chain of
fundamental relations, not a complete graph/web.
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intrinsic properties such as charge.
Clearly this constitutes a further liberalisation of the standard form of Humean Su-
pervenience, since both the formal and informal definition of Separability presupposed
absolutism. Moreover, the informal definition comprised Quantity Primitivism about ab-
solute masses, whereas, although absolute masses still ‘exist’ in regularity comparativism,
they are not fundamental6. We will discuss below whether this is a problem, and if so how
it might be solved. For now we will just go with it.
The analogue of the sets of ontological coordinates is the sets of distributions of absolute
mass quantities that are compatible with the fundamental mass ratios. Since a choice of
absolute mass for one particle fixes all the other absolute masses via the mass ratios, this
set of ontological mass coordinates can be parameterised by the absolute mass quantity
of one specific body.
For each value of the absolute mass scale parameter we consider the best axiomatisation
of the mosaic so ‘coordinatised’. The claim is then that only for the single correct value
of the parameter the best axiomatisation comprises the laws of Newtonian Gravity, and
that these are the best laws overall.
5 A disanalogy with regularity relationalism?
In the remaining three sections I will discuss three objections to regularity comparativism
about mass in Newtonian Gravity. The first can be avoided; the second raises more serious
problems; the third is fatal.
One might concede that the regularity protocol provides the inertial frames, but never-
theless fails to provide the absolute mass scale, by arguing that the mass and space cases
are disanalogous.
The regularity approach claims that only for a subset of the ontological ‘coordinates’
the laws are best, and those best laws are the laws of Newtonian Gravity. In other words:
L(co) = LNG(co) +Lcorr(co), that is in general there will be correction terms (i.e. fictional
forces in the space case). Only for the Best System Coordinates (i.e. the inertial frames
in the space case) will the correction terms go to zero: L(cbs) = LNG(cbs). Finally, and
crucially, there is no alternative way of writing LNG(co) + Lcorr(co) (for coordinates that
are not part of the best system) that is as simple as LNG(cbs).
Now, this final claim seems plausible in the case of regularity relationalism. But, the
argument goes, it is much less plausible in the case of comparativism. It is true that if
we do not change the units of mass, position, Newton’s constant and the accelerations
involved, choosing the wrong absolute mass scale will mean that LNG(co) maps those
masses to the wrong numerical values of the accelerations (i.e. the data that we are trying
6Nor intrinsic (Martens 2017).
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to account for). This would imply that a correctional term is required. But, the argument
goes, what if, whenever we choose the ‘incorrect’ absolute mass scale, we just adjust the
numerical value of Newton’s constant accordingly. LNG(co(G)) + Lcorr(co) can always be
rewritten as LNG(co(G
′)). Thus, for each choice of mass scale we could get an equally
simple law; the only difference is the numerical value of G in each of these laws. In other
words, the regularity approach fails in its main aim: picking out a unique absolute mass
scale.
The correct response7 is that this aim is too strict. Even in the space case, the regularity
protocol picks out not one frame but a set of inertial frames, related by the Galilean
Symmetry of the theory (or translations). In the mass case, only G · m is empirically
accessible, not the absolute mass separately (cf. the escape velocity inequality). Scaling
m and G such that G · m remains constant is a symmetry of the theory. What the
comparativist’s bucket really demonstrates is the empirical meaningfulness of G ·m. The
correct aim is then to pick out a unique G ·m, which of course implies that we expect the
regularity protocol to pick out a specific (infinitely large) set of pairs of G’s and m’s. The
regularity protocol does seem to succeed in this aim.
6 Separability
As pointed out earlier, regularity comparativism is blatantly contradicting one of the two
theses comprising Humean Supervenience, the thesis of Separability, which presupposes
absolutism about all non-spatio-temporal quantities. Two options immediately spring
to mind: either liberalising or generalising the definition of Separability such that
(regularity) comparativism does in fact satisfy it, or giving up Separability altogether
and arguing that Supervenience can be used by itself to carry out the regularity protocol.
The latter option might seem best. The crux of the regularity approach is to have
the inertial frames or the absolute mass scale supervene on some appropriate mosaic.
The separability of that mosaic does not seem to play much of a role. Nevertheless, the
Humeans have had to deal with one notorious charge of non-separability before, and in that
case they were very reluctant to stray too far from the Separability condition. This is the
case of entanglement in quantum mechanics. The details of this case are neatly rehearsed
by, for instance, Maudlin (2007a), and need not detain us here. What is relevant here is
that the Humeans accept that entangled quantum states are non-separable in the strict
sense, but insist on defending some generalised version of Separability rather than just
giving up any sort of separability condition altogether. Albert (1996) notes that the wave
function lives in 3N -dimensional configuration space (with N the number of particles in the
7I would like to thank Chris Wu¨thrich for insisting that this response has more to it than I originally
thought.
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universe), and the wavefunction does specify intrinsic values (namely two, the amplitude
and the phase) for each point of that higher-dimensional space. It is thus suggested that we
should give up on 4D-fundamentalism and take configuration space to be the fundamental
arena of physics. (Of course one then needs to tell a story of how this is consistent with
our manifest image of the world around us being four-dimensional. Albert tells such a
story, but we need not dwell on it here.) We could then define an analogue of Separability
by quantifying instead over the points of that configuration space, and we may naturally
want to call this new condition Generalised Separability.
Enter Shakespeare. “What’s in a name?” Why should we care whether this new
condition is satisified or not? Simply because its name is similar to a previous condition
we cared about? In fact, why did we ever care about Separability? Albert’s implicit
motivation seems to be that the classical world, that is “ ‘familiar macroscopic objects’
under so-called ‘familiar macroscopic circumstances’ ” (1996, 282), is manifestly separable
(assuming absolutism of course). Maudlin finds similar motivations in Lewis and Einstein.
But the argument that new physics should be separable because physics so far has been
separable is an inductive argument. We would expect Humeans, of all people, to be the last
to endorse such an invalid argument. Even if this motivation were valid, it is not clear why
this in any way would motivate Generalised Separability. This motivation is clearly about
the 4D manifestion of the classical world. Moreover, even if a separate motivation for
General Separability were to be provided (for instance realism about quantum mechanics,
as Albert suggests), General Separability never did replace Separability. As hinted at
earlier, the formal definition of Separability in consistent with quantification over emergent
spacetime points. In other words, even if the wave function is separable in the generalised
sense in configuration space, it would still be non-separable at the level of the 4D spacetime
that has to emerge somehow from the configuration space.
We have arrived back at the suggestion of just leaving Separability behind, and sticking
only with Supervenience (as Dasgupta does [2013]). From the standpoint of the regularity
approach, this is all that we need. However, even though Supervenience is logically inde-
pendent from Separability, we need to make sure that we can still motivate Supervenience
once Separability is given up. We need to make sure that they did not come as a package
deal. Why might we be motivated to hold Supervenience?
Let us recall the first sentence of the quote from Lewis: “Humean supervenience is
named in honor of the greater [sic] denier of necessary connections.” (1986, ix). Hume
(1777) is famous for arguing that necessary connections between two events (the first
of which we call the cause and the second of which we call the effect) are merely ideas
of the mind, but not ‘things’ that can be observed. All that can be observed is constant
conjugation of pairs of events. Humean empiricists therefore urge us to purge necessary
connections (between what we call causes and effects), that is causation, from our meta-
physics. Insofar as the notions of causation and laws are related, this form of empiricism
8
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted)
Please use DOI when citing or quoting
also gets rid of laws as fundamental concepts.
But if it is an empiricist dislike for necessary connections that motivates Supervenience,
then Humean Supervenience comes as a package deal. This type of empiricist will also be
committed to a separable mosaic. As Dewar puts it: “Prima facie, the kind of world that
violates Separability is one in which there are necessary connections between distinct exis-
tents: that is, in which there are fundamental and irreducible relations between pointlike
things” (2015, 15) (italics in the original). Entangled states are such that, say, if a mea-
surement on one of the entangled particles results in ‘up’, the measurement of the other
one will necessarily result in ‘down’. Note that ‘necessarily’ is here not to be read (just) as
an inter-world notion, but rather an intra-world notion in the same sense as when Hume
argues against one event (the cause) necessitating another later event in the same world
(the effect). If there are two distinct physical systems consisting of massive particles, the
behaviour of one will necessitate the behaviour of the other given the inter-system mass
ratios. This does not detract from the mass ratios being totally contingent in the sense
that they can differ between worlds/mosaics. The Humean might retort that on their
framework the mass ratios and the trajectories are completely independently specifiable.
In particular, we are free to have the second system behave differently from the way one
would expect given the inter-system mass ratios. However, not only would this result in a
world that is nomologically impossible according to Newtonian Gravity, it is also to admit
that mass is in no way related to anything that is observable and it is therefore redundant.
As will be discussed below, purging any notion of mass from the mosaic (since the tra-
jectories do all the work by themselves) leads to what I believe to be the most defensible
Humean position—regularity eliminativism—but is fatal for regularity comparativism. To
sum up, if this dislike for necessary connections is the only motivation for Humean Super-
venience, then this motivates both Supervenience and Separability. Separability cannot
be given up without the whole thesis collapsing. A combination of comparativism and
Humeanism is doomed from the start.
We have yet one other motivation to consider though. Huggett himself mentions that
ontological parsimony (i.e. Ockham’s razor) is the best justification for Humeanism:
“The best argument for MRL is that it is metaphysically parsimonious and faces no knock-
down objection” (2006, fn.3). Whether a Separable physical state is more ontologically
parsimonious than a non-separable state is discussed elsewhere (Martens 2017, Ch.5). Here
this is not immensely relevant. In contrast to the motivation from Humean Empiricism,
where the dislike for necessary connections was a black-and-white matter which implied
both Separability and Supervenience, ontological parsimony is a matter of degree. If Su-
pervenience produces any ‘amount’ of gain in ontological parsimony, this will speak in
favour of Supervenience. Of course it would be ideal if any loss in ontological parsimony
due to the non-separability of comparativism would not outweigh the gain due to Super-
venience, but when comparing regularity comparativism to comparativism simpliciter any
9
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degree of gain in ontological parsimony would provide a justification for Supervenience by
itself.
Why then would Supervenience be more ontologically parsimonious than governing law
views such as primitivism which take laws to be irreducible nomic facts over and above
the occurrent facts (Maudlin 2007a, Ch.1)? Presumably because the Humean helps herself
only to the mosaic, and does not require any additional nomic facts over and above the
occurrent facts. But that is simply the wrong comparison. The governing law camp helps
themselves, fundamentally, not to the full 4D mosaic, but merely to some initial conditions
(i.e. a 3D mosaic)8 plus fundamental laws (or dispositions). The remaining dimension of
the Humean mosaic, eternally far towards the past and into the future, supervenes on those
initial conditions and the laws. Moreover, the governing law camp can help themselves
to a small set of ‘timeless’ mass ratios—they hold at the initial time, and since the law
does not evolve them, they hold at all times—whereas the Humean needs to ‘buy into’
instantaneous mass ratios for every instant of the 4D mosaic (and these mass ratios need
to always be the same, without any explanation given).
Where does this leave us? Now it is clear that the Humean’s fundamental ontology
is not simply a subset of the ontology of the opposing camp, but instead a different set
of ‘things’, it becomes difficult to say much about their relative ontological parsimony. I
do not intend to settle this debate here. Instead I will end this section by pointing out
that, even if the criterion of ontological parsimony would favour a Humean account of laws
and regularity comparativism, in the next section we will see that such a principle brings
with it a whole other threat to comparativism: eliminativism. Regularity comparativism
finds itself in dangerous waters between the non-separable Scylla of Humean Empiricism
(i.e. the dislike of necessary connections) and the eliminativist Charybdis of ontological
parsimony.
7 Stopping criterion & Eliminativism
A final objection against the regularity protocol is that it is “too easy” (Huggett 2006,
70). If the regularity approach succeeds in reducing inertial frames and absolute masses,
why not use it to reduce any other notion as well (Arntzenius 2012)? Pooley, for instance,
worries that the approach could be used to reduce even the temporal metric and the
Leibnizian relations (2013, 567)? It seems we need a non-ad-hoc criterion for determining
how much stuff we can heave over from the supervenience base to the supervenient level.
But in the case of regularity relationalism it is not really clear why this is worrisome.
As long as purging the supervenience base still produces the correct laws, is that not a good
8The issue remains of deciding which time is supposed to be the fundamental initial time (Casey
McCoy, personal communication).
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thing? Especially Humean Empiricists should be happy to give up as many ontologically
fundamental notions as possible, motivated by ontological parsimony.
In fact, Stevens succesfully outlines how one might reduce metrical notions—as Pooley
mentioned—in the Special Relativistic case, by reducing them to a mosaic consisting
only of topological relations (2014). Pooley even discusses such a project a bit later in
the same paper (2013, 6.3.2). He does correctly warn us that we might not be able to
throw away everything from the supervenience base, because at some point we would not
expect the regularity approach to generate the Newtonian laws anymore (but presumably
some ‘simpler’ laws) (2013, fn.88). But from this it does not follow that we need some
independent criterion to ensure that we stop throwing away stuff from the supervenience
base at exactly that point; it is the regularity approach itself that tells us that it will break
down at that point and we should thus not purge the supervenience base any further.
The case of regularity comparativism is importantly different. Empiricism, or more
generally the desideratum of ontological parsimony, should welcome the opportunity of not
only reducing absolute masses, but also mass ratios. In other words, regularity elimi-
nativism—where the mosaic is purged of any mass properties—should be preferable over
regularity comparativism. (In fact, this view was suggested for independent reasons by Hall
(2012), and praised for its virtues by Esfeld et al.9) But this would imply that, by adopting
the regularity approach, the comparativist has thrown away the massive baby with the
bath water. Given that the regularity comparativist had already recognised the empirical
meaningfulness of absolute masses, as encoded in the different particle trajectories in the
mosaic, regularity eliminativism would combine with weak absolutism—the corresponding
picture of the world would be a purely spatio-temporal mosaic which grounds the masses
which in turn ground the mass ratios. Comparativism has overshot its goal.
For the comparativist it then does become important to provide an independent crite-
rion for preventing the reduction of mass beyond the absolute masses. Elsewhere (2016,
2017) I do in fact provide an argument against eliminativism simpliciter. However, as is
made clear there, it is exactly the regularity version of comparativism which cannot help
itself to that argument. I consider whether initial conditions and laws which are purged
from any notion of mass by replacing it with spatio-temporal quantities could still solve
the corresponding set of initial value problems. The answer is negative. But along the
way I discuss a less restricted attempt at reducing mass to spatio-temporal quantities by
Narlikar (1939). Narlikar argues that, if we help ourselves to spatio-temporal quantities at
a certain number of distinct instants—something we were not allowed to help ourselves to
in the previous setting—we can reduce the mass ratios. And this should not be surprising.
We only ever successfully discovered Newton’s laws and the law of universal gravitation
9See Loewer (1996), Esfeld et al. (Esfeld 2014; Esfeld, Lazarovici, Lam, and Hubert 2015; Esfeld,
Deckert, and Oldofredi 2015; Esfeld and Deckert 2016; Vassallo, Deckert, and Esfeld 2017) and Hubert
(2015).
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from a set of data consisting of (a subset of) the eliminativist mosaic. The eliminativist
project in Narlikar’s sense must be true somehow.
In other words, it is unclear why any Humean Empiricist was committed to (Quantity)
Primitivism—either about absolute masses or mass ratios—in the first place. Regularity
eliminativism seems the most harmonious version of the regularity approach anyway. So
much the worse for comparativism.
8 Conclusion
This paper applied Huggett’s regularity approach—a liberalised version of the Mill-Ramsey-
Lewis Best Systems Account within the framework of (Humean) Supervenience—to com-
parativism about mass within Newtonian Gravity. It seems that the regularity approach
indeed succeeds in its aim, once that is correctly interpreted as recovering the product of
Newton’s constant and the absolute mass from a comparativist Humean mosaic. It nev-
ertheless clashes with the Separability clause of the Humean framework. An even more
important reason for concluding that regularity comparativism is untenable is that once
we employ the regularity approach in order to reduce away absolute masses, there is no
reason not to also reduce the mass ratios. The regularity approach to comparativism
throws away the massive baby with the bath water.
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